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THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
by
LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE K. OSBORN, USA

when the PLA had to step forward and help
pick up the pieces, and since the peak of the
G r e a t Proletarian Cultural Revolution
(GPCR), when the PLA has held the country
together as the State and Party bureaucracies
have undergone reconstruction.
The post-1949 trough in magnitude was in
the 1950's-roughly from the end of active
hostilities in Korea in 1953 t o the Lushan
Conference and the suppression of P'eng
Te-huai in 1959-when the PLA played what
would appear t o Western observers a more
conventional military role. The major
concerns of the PLA during this period of just
over half a decade were essentially internal
ones of force modernization and training, in
which the PLA absorbed the conventional
equipment and doctrine. The political
socialization role of the PLA in those years
appears to have been concentrated in impact
on the members of the PLA itself-the short
term service personnel who passed through
the ranks, and the longer term officers and
other ranks who made up the more or less
permanent cadre. In fact, one might speculate
that the PLA played a counter-role in political
socialization at that time to the extent that it
inculcated a set of concepts and a professional
military ethos-something we might label
"better expert than red."

(What is the role o f the Chinese People's
Liberation Army in the Political
Socialization o f the Chinese People?)

The hypothesis here advanced is that,
except for a period during the decade of the
1950's, the Chinese People's Liberation Army
(PLA) has played a major role in the political
socialization not only of those who serve (or
have served) in its ranks but also of the
Chinese people at 1arge.l This article is
intended to project the conceptual framework
of the hypothesis and to highlight areas where
additional research would be useful.
Obviously, the magnitude of the political
socialization role has varied over time-both
as a function of its importance relative to
other roles for the PLA as well as its
importance relative to other institutions
which also play some part in the process. The
post-1949 peaks of magnitude appear to have
been in the immediate 1949-53 period, when
other bureaucratic institutions of the State
and Party were in the process of construction,
expansion, and consolidation. They occurred
in the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward,
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HISTORY

The historical roots of the PLA role in
political socialization, of course, go back
almost as far as the very foundation of the
Chinese Red Army itself in the late 1920's.
Indeed, they possibly may go back even
farther to the young cadres who paved the
way politically for the Northern Expedition.
Mao Tse-tung recognized the importance of
the Red Army in political socialization in his
"The Struggle in the Chingkang Mountains"
in 1928, and, in his critique, "On Correcting
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Mistaken Ideas in the Party," drawn up for
the Ninth Party Congress of the Fourth Red
Army in 1929, when he pointed out:

the backbone of the administration in m u c h
of China.
Even during the Korean War (1950-53), the
role of the PLA in political socialization
remained significant. The leaders filled
important posts in the civil administration
while continuing to hold both military rank
and position, and the PLA had to carry out
productive activities in the economy and mass
work among the people. The PLA also
participated in the land reform activities
following the decision t o carry out land
reform in 195 1 , while at the same time
standardizing equipment and training, with
some assistance from the USSR. The People's
Militia, while not under PLA control,
inevitably relied upon the PLA for equipment
and training, but the militia program had not
really developed much momentum by
1954.
The reorganization of the state structure in
1954 was accompanied by a shift in the PLA
role. As noted already, the PLA concentrated
its efforts on the modernization and training
o f t h e p o s t - K o r e a forces, and the
s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f c e n t r a l government
ministerial/bureaucratic control as well as the
expansion of the party structure reduced the
role of the PLA. The shift t o conscription in
1955 meant that more young men would
"pass through" the PLA and then back into
civilian life, thus giving the PLA a role in
socializing these individuals. But the relatively
small size of the PLA as a function of total
population or even as a function of those
coming of conscript age each year limited the
impact the PLA might have. In addition,
demobilization of long-term volunteers during
and after 1955 sent into the civilian sector
five million or more individuals who had been
thoroughly socialized during PLA service.
Although the argument between two
schools, crudely labeled "better expert than
red," headed by P'eng Te-huai, and "better
red than expert" or "both expert and red,"
headed by Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao was t o
continue until 1959, it was obvious by 1957
that it was serious and that the stakes were
high. The PLA was drawn into the
rectification campaign of 1957 and the Great
Leap Forward, both as a subject and as an

. . . The

Red Army fights not merely for
the sake of fighting but in order to
conduct propaganda among the masses,
organize them, arm them, and help them
to establish revolutionary political power.
Without these objectives, fighting loses its
meaning and the Red Army loses the
reason for its existence.2
During the Long March, the Red Army
devoted its major efforts t o self-preservation;
but even during these trying days, both the
Red Army and the Party organizations took
advantage of every opportunity t o engage in
p r o s e l y t i z i n g activities.3 The political
socialization activities of the Red Army
during the Yenan Period, both internally and
externally, have been described by Edgar
Snow in his Red Star Over China. The
expansion of the Red Army and its auxiliaries
during the Japanese War (1937-45) and the
building both of Party organizations and local
governments with the assistance of the Red
Army provide ample evidence of the
importance assigned t o political socialization
by the Army.4 The missions of the Red Army
during this period were described, allegedly
by Mao Tse-tung, as:
(1) to fight the Japanese invaders,
(2) to carry on productive activities, and
(3) to carry on mass work among the people.5

The Civil War years (1946-49) saw great
changes in the PLA-it became a large,
reasonably well-trained force with sufficient
h e a v y e q u i p m e n t t o fight large-scale
c o n v e n t i o n a l c a m p a i g n s against the
Kuomintang (KMT). Obviously, it had to be
preoccupied with the conduct of military
affairs. Nevertheless, its role in political
socialization could not be and was not
ignored. Former Japanese puppet and
ex-KMT soldiers had t o be converted into
effective members of the PLA; mass work had
to be carried on in both "old" and "new"
liberated areas; and the PLA had to provide
23

People's Liberation Army in a Tenth Anniversary Parade.
political interests, we must emphasize the
political side. . . . Henceforth it will still
be a fundamental task in the building of
our army to strengthen theoretical
education in Marxism-Leninism, to
strengthen education in socialism and the
general line of the Party and to link this
closely with the practice of contemporary
revolutionary struggle and the change in
the thinking of the members of the
army. . . .6

object. Lin Piao s u m m e d u p t h e problem a n d
a n n o u n c e d t h e victory o f t h e Mao-Lin
position as follows:
In building up our army into a
modernized army, we should of course
pay very great attention to improving
equipment and mastering technique. But
we must at the same time pay attention
to the other side, which is indeed the
predominant side . . . we must not forget
24

People's Liberation Army member assisting Mongolian peasants.

probably anticipated the degree of PLA
involvement that would come in 1967 and
1968, the PLA clearly assumed a prominent
position when Chieh-fang-chun Pao published
the editorial, "Hold High the Great Red
Banner of Mao Tse-tung's Thought and
Actively Participate in the Great Socialist
Cultural Revolution," on April 18, 1966.
Then, as the GPCR tore apart the fabric of
both Party and State organization, the PLA

RECENT EXAMPLES

Of course, the most recent examples of the
military playing a major role in political
socialization are associated with the Great
Proletarian Cultural Revolution and its
aftermath. In fact, it might be argued that the
PLA anticipated the GPCR by its campaign to
study Mao Tse-tung's thought even prior to
1966. At any rate, even though few, if any,
25

are from unknown background, and one
appears to have been a bureaucrat. In
addition, although we lack detailed data on
county and commune Party committees, the
reports of travelers and refugees seem to
indicate a significant military presence there
also.
Similarly, in the field of education, at all
levels, we find the PLA playing an important
role. The existence of worker, peasant, and
soldier students at the reopened universities in
1970 and 197 1 is accompanied by notice of
PLA men in key places in university
administration. At the primary and middle
school levels, we find not only discharged
soldiers serving as teachers but also emphasis
on military or paramilitary training through
the "Little Red Guards." The May 7 Cadre
Schools, organized along military lines, also
may represent a significant extension of the
PLA's role.

f o u n d itself assuming ever greater
responsibilities for the day-to-day governance
of China.
Many of the events of the GPCR remain
unknown to us, and there are many known
events and factors we cannot explain to our
satisfaction today. Nevertheless, it is clear
that the PLA itself went through serious
internal struggle between or among various
factions. We know that the General Political
Department of the PLA Headquarters
disappeared from public view for some two
years and that political guidance came from
the Political Work and Literary and Art Units
of the Military Affairs Committee of the CCP
Central Committee, and from the Cultural
Revolution Group of the PLA, Chiang Ching
(Mao's wife).
In spite of the difficulties within the PLA,
it is obvious that most of its command and
control mechanisms remained intact and
functioning and that the central leadership of
the Party and Government were able to rely
on the PLA in restoring stability. The
Revolutionary Committees, formed during
1967-68, were based on the formula of the
three-way alliance of the PLA, cadres, and
revolutionary masses; but it is obvious that
the PLA was at least primus inter pares,
except possibly in the case of Shanghai.
More recently, in the reconstruction of the
29 provincial-level Party committees in China,
beginning in November 1970 and running
through August 1971, the PLA continues t o
occupy a prominent position. Of 29
provincial level Party committee leadership
groups, 13 first secretaries have a clearly
professional military background, 10 come
from the ranks of past or present PLA
political commissars, and only six might be
called party professionals. In the ranks of
second secretaries and secretaries, 27 out of
97 are professional officers, another 30 are or
were political commissars, seven appear to
have spent most of their careers (at least since
1949) in the state bureaucracy and 24 are
Party professionals. The remaining nine must
be the representatives of the "masses," "old,
middle-aged, and young." Finally, of the 32
deputy secretaries announced by NCNA,7 11
are either professional officers or political
commissars, 18 are Party professionals, two

CONCLUSION

Two factors should be reasonably obvious
by now. First, it is feasible to conclude that
the PLA and its predecessor, the Red Army,
have had a significant political role to play
from their very beginnings, when Mao
Tse-tung and Chu Te met in south Hunan in
the spring of 1928 and proceeded to establish
the Fourth Red Army. Second, since
1966-67, with the serious dislocation of Party
and State machinery, the PLA has served as
the principal agent of the CCP leadership, first
in holding the People's Republic together,
second in reconstructing both Party and
State. Hence, the PLA has become the single
most important organized political force in
China. In addition, as Ralph L. Powell has
recently shown, the PLA has assumed an
increasing and significant economic role.8
What inferences may we draw from all of
this? Obviously, any answers we essay must
be tempered by the observation of impending
leadership changes at the top-Mao Tse-tung is
78 and Chou En-lai is 73. Lin Piao, at 64 one
of the younger members of the old leadership
and Mao's onetime heir-apparent, now is out
of contention for power. Nevertheless, given
China's essentially defensive strategy-one it
has pursued consistently since 1949-the state
of internal communications, the importance
26

of the agricultural sector in China's economy,
t h e relative underdevelopment of the
industrial sector, the size of the population,
and so forth, it appears that the Chinese
Communist Party and the leadership of the
P e o p l e ' s Republic have succeeded in
integrating the PLA into the social, political
and economic life of China in a way
unequaled in any of the other so-called
developing nations. Unlike the leadership we
find in some other military establishments
and states, the present Chinese leadership
does n o t want its armed forces to be a
professional island, isolated from society,
intervening from time to time, and then
attempting to withdraw. The efforts t o
restore the balance in China since October
1971 are further logical steps toward political
integration.
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NOTES

1. The

definition of

political socialization

Members of the Ansai Company in Yenan studying the teaching of Chairman Mao.
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